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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Anti-Trust Laws-Price Discrimination Act-Requisite
Competitive Injury and Burden of Proof
Immediately following the passage of the Robinson-Patman Amendment to §2 of the Clayton Act,1 considerable discussion took place
concerning its probable effect on the marketing structure of the nation, 2
together with some speculation as to how its controversial provisions
would be treated by the Federal Trade Commission and in the courts.3
Now in its twelfth year, the Act is seen to be "in a very important
period of judicial review and construction,"'4 as important questions
of interpretation and administration are being decided in increasing
numbers by the Supreme Court.3 Some of these were considered recently in Federal Trade Comnmission v.Morton Salt Co.6
There, a cease and desist order had been issued against Morton Salt
as a result of a finding by the Commission that the respondent's use
of a "standard quantity discount system" in the sale of its products
amounted to a price discrimination within the meaning of §2(a).7 On
review, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the Commission's findings and order, and directed a dismissal of the complaint s
'38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (1946).
'E.g., BUSINESS AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN LAW (Werne ed. 1938); ZORN
& FEiLDMAN, BUsINESs UNDER THE NEW PicE LAws (1937); Burns, Anti-Trust

Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4 LAW & CONTEmP. PROD. 301, 30819 (1937); George, Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: The First Year, 4
LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 392 (1937); Learned & Isaacs, The Robinson-Patman
Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations, 15 HARV. Bus. REv. 137 (1937);
McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs and the Robinson-Patman Act, 4 LAW &
CoNTEmP. PROB. 334 (1937); Smith, The Patman Act in Practice, 35 MxcHi. L,
R.xv. 705 (1937); The Robinson-PatmanAct in Action, 46 YALE L. J. 447 (1937);
Note, Marketing Under the Robinson- PatmanAct, 31 ILL. L. REv. 907 (1937).
'E.g., PATMAN, THE RoBINSON-PATIAN Acr (1938); Copeland, The Problen of Administering the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 HARV. Bus. Rv. 156 (1937);
McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United States: A Survey, 4 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROD. 273, 289-96 (1937) ; McLaughlin, The Courts and the Robinson-

Patman Act: Possibilitiesof Construction, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 410 (1937);
Stevens, W. H. S., An Interpretationof the Robinson-Patman Act, 2 J. MARKETING 38 (1937).

' Haslett, Price Discriminationsad Their Justifications Under the RobinsonPatman Act of 1936, 46 MIcn-. L. REv. 450, 451 (1948).
'E.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 822 (1948);
Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 68 Sup. Ct. 793 (1948) ; Bruce's

Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U. S.743 (1947); Corn Products Refining
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S.726 (1945); Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S.746 (1945).
668 Sup. Ct. 822 (1948).
'Morton
Salt Co., 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944), order modified, 40 F.T.C. 388 (1945).
8
Morton Salt Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 162 F. 2d 949 (C.CA. 7th
1947), 60 HARV. L. Rav. 1167 (1948), 42 ILL. L. REv. 556 (1948), 15 U. or CR.
L. Rav. 384 (1948).
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The majority of the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Black, held, inter alia, that 1.) the announced quantity discounts were discriminatory, 2.) the burden of justifying the discrimination rested with the company, and 3.) there had been a sufficient showing by the Commission that the discrimination had the required effect
on competition. Accordingly, the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals was reversed. 9
On the question of discrimination, it should be noted first that Morton's price system, given by the Supreme Court as
Per case
Less-than-carload purchases ................. $1.60
Carload purchases ......................... 1.50
5,000-case purchases in ny consecutive
12 months ............................. 1.40
50,000-case purchases in any consecutive
12 months ............................ 1.35,
involved both of the two general types of quantity discounts, viz., the
non-cumulative or unit delivery discount which is based on the size of
the individual order (here represented by the ten cent discount for carload purchases), and the cumulative or volume discount based on the
aggregate volume of orders filled within a specified period of time regardless of the size or number of orders within that period. 0
Prior to this time reasonable non-cumulative discounts had not generally been regarded with disfavor by those charged with the enforcement of the Act, whereas cumulative discounts were consistently deemed
discriminatory, 11 except those so arranged that even the smaller buyers
could avail themselves of all the quantity limits. 1 2 The reason for this
lies in the fact that the unit delivery discounts have an obvious commercial utility, savings in selling and delivery cost, 13 while cumulative
'68 Sup. Ct. 822 (1948). Mr. Justice Jackson, joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissented inpart. Other questions, not treated in this note, were considered,

e.g., smallness of the item, id. at 829 and 835 (dissenting opinion) on which see,
H. C. Brill Co., 26 F.T.C. 666, 680 (1938) ; Bayly, Four Years Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 25

468-9.

MINN.

L. REv. 131, 145 (1941); Haslett, supra note 4, at

"0Ostlund, The Robinson-Patman Act and Quantity Discounts, 14 ACCOUNTING
REv. 402, 403 (1939) ; Stevens, Some Laws of Quantity Discounts, 2 J. Bus. 406

(1929).

" Haslett, supra note 4, at 463-4 and Commission cases cited. Maclntyre,
Section 2(a): Its Application to the Quantity Price, SymosIuM ON RoBIxsoNPATMAN ACT, Naw YORIC STATE BAR Ass'N (CCH) 10, at 16 (1948)
(herein-

after cited as SYmpOSIUm). By reasonable non-cumulative discounts is meant
those not clearly disproportionate to delivery costs.
22

E.g., Kraft-Phoenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937) ; American Optical

Co., 28 F.T.C. 169 (1939). See Bayly, supra note 9, at 146. Crowley, Equal Price
Treatment Under the Robinson-PatinanAct, 95 U. oF PA. L. REv. 306, 328 (1947).
"' Stevens, W. H. S., Some Laws on Quantity Discounts, 3 J. Bus. 51, 55-6

(1930) ; 31 ILL. L. Rlv. 907, 921 (1937).
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discounts are commercially advantageous primarily with respect to
in
manufacturing costs only, and even there the saving may be more
14
theory than in fact, especially in the sale of stock merchandise.
In holding the system to be discriminatory the majority of the Court
made no distinction between these types, but looked to the fact that the
discount brackets were so broad only five large retail chain grocers had
ever quialified for the cheapest rate offered, while some of their small
independent competitors were unable to qualify even for the carload
price. Thus, though ostensibly the discounts were available to all on
equal terms, "functionally" they were not, the actual result being a
rather large differential in price among competitors. Accordingly, since
"the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress considered it an evil that a large buyer could
secure a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the
large buyer's quantity purchasing ability"' 5 such a differential (involving competitive injury) is a discrimination under the Act.
Unquestionably, the objective of some of the proponents of the Act
was to eliminate as far as possible the competitive advantage of large
chain stores as indicated by the Court. It is not quite as certain, however, that either the intent of Congress or the words of the Act went
the full distance toward that objective. 18 Indeed, the Robinson-Patman
Act purports to take its place with that segment of the broad field of
anti-trust law which is concerned with promoting fair competition. This
seems to indicate that its purpose was to remove the competitive advan14

Sawyer, The Commission's Administration of Paragraph2(a) f the Robin-

son-Patman Act: An Appraisal, 8 GEo. W.sH. L. Ray. 469, 476-8, 488-90 (1940);

H. C. Brill Co. 26 F.T.C. 666 (1938), discussed in Bayly, supra note 9, at 163-4.
Copeland, supra note 3, at 163-4; Ostlund, supra note 10, at 403 ("Actually it
has appeared at times that costs of supplying purchasers of large volume may
exceed as a percentage of sales the cost of supplying certain smaller purchasers.").
Stevens, W. H. S., An Interpretationof the Robinson-Patman Act, 2 J. MARKET-

38, 42 (1937) ; Freer, Accounting Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
65 J. AccouNTANcy 480, 484 (1938); Thorp, Price Discrimination and Cost, 63
ING

J. AccouNTANCy

183, 184 (1937).

" Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 822, 826 (1948).
See Learned & Isaacs, supra note 2, at 142 (behind the Act is a general assumption

against bigness) and George, Federal Trade Commission Decision in the Goodyear
Case III, 44 DuN's REvIEw 5, 9-10 (June 1936) (briefly summarizing both sides

of "big v. little" argument).
"8Learned & Issacs, supra note 2, at 149 ("It was the apparent intention of
Congress, however, to preserve for these institutions [the large chains] their
operating efficiencies.").

That Congress intended a justified price differential to

be lawful even though it operated in favor of a large buyer is obvious from the
fact it made other and specific provision (quantity limits proviso, infra note 19)
for such a contingency. Patman, op. cit. supra note 3, at 260- ("It is entirely
possible that quantity discounts of such proportions may be legally granted as to
enable large dealers to drive out smaller ones. This is the very reason that a
protective factor was incorporated [quantity limits proviso]."). See also 80
CoNG. Rac. 8111, 6282 (1936).

19481

NOTES AND COMMENTS

tage of large buyers only to the extent that such advantage was unfair.' 7
And "large quantity purchasing ability" is not in itself unfair-it is
merely a power, obtained through the utilization of an efficient method
of sales and distribution, which may be used either fairly, to encourage
competition by effecting savings to the consumer,'8 or unfairly, to suppress competition and create monopoly. The Act strikes only at the
latter use of this power, not at the power itself.' 9 This point is recognized by the Court-but it is stressed by the minority in urging that a
distinction should be made "between discounts which the Act would
foster and those it would condemn." 20
The conclusion then that Morton's cumulative discount system is a
discrimination is entirely supportable. Yet this phase of the opinion
appears open to the criticism that the language (quoted at note 15
above) overstates the proposition in such a manner as to open the way
for an application of the Act to situations beyond its scope, which can
work a detriment to those small buyers for whose benefit it was
2
enacted. 1
"?For an excellent statement of the meaning of competition see Stevens, W. H.
S., An Interpretation of the Robinron-Patinan Act, 2 J. MARKETING 38 (1937).
Bayly, mtpra note 9, at 187 (meaning of unfair).
18 See Stevens, W. H. S., Brief for Respondent, Raymond Bros.-Clark Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 280 F. 529 (C.C.A. 8th 1922) reprinted in OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL. ANTI-TRuST LAWS 720, 721 (1948)

("Each of these

systems of distribution [the old line 'wholesaler-retailer-consumer' and the chainstore 'retailer-consumer'] thus in conflict is entitled economically under the rule
of fair competition to compete with the other on the basis of the prices of the
goods, their quality, and such incidental service as may be rendered, and each
system is entitled economically to survive to the extent to which it serves the
public in these respects. The one system might conceivably eliminate the other,
but if this elimination be due to lower prices, better quality, superior service ..
the elimination in question is but a part of the competitive process.").
10 As pointed out mpra note 16, where the Commission finds, after due investigation and hearing, that there are so few purchasers able to qualify for large quantity discounts in a certain commodity that the situation is promotive of monopoly,
it may establish quantity limits under the second proviso of §2(a). Thus "the
Act puts a limitation on producing and selling efficiency at a point where it seems
likely to injure competition. . . . The economic and competitive theory lying
behind this provision is much the same as that which has been consistently applied
by the Interstate Commerce Commission in rejecting applications for lower rates
on train load than on carload lots." Stevens, An Interpretation of the RobinsonPatman Act, 2 J. MARKcETING 38, 45 (1937).
The first use to be made of the Commission's power under this proviso was
begun by a resolution to investigate the tire industry, adopted July 7, 1947. CCH
TRADE REG. SEnv. ff24,015 (FTC 1948).
"o
Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 822, 834 (1948).
Stevens, supra note 19, at 45 ("The danger to fair competition comes not primarily from the customary and relatively small ... differentials given by nearly
all sellers and taken advantage of by hundreds and thousands of distributors, but
rather from the large differentials . . . available only to a limited number of
large mass buyers. With its power to prescribe quantity limits [the Commission's]
real opportunity lies in the elimination of the unreasonably large and discriminatory differentials, which are and alwayg have been a real menace to fair competition.").
21 Learned & Isaacs, supra note 2, at 150, 154-5; George, Business Adjusts Itself to the Robinson-Patnman Act, 45 DuN's REVIEW 11, 12 (March 1937) ; Ostlund, mpra note 10, at 403; 31 ILL. L. REV. 907, 939 (1937).
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Even where a price schedule contains wide differentials, it may
nevertheless be lawful if justifiable under the cost difference or other
proviso of the Act, 22 which brings us to the second phase of the case.
The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals had been understood as
requiring that in order to establish a violation the Commission must
show not only a price differential between competing buyers but also
the absence of any justification, on the theory that there is no discrimination so long as the differential may be justified.23
It is not clear
whether the Supreme Court so understood the opinion, but its position
on this much discussed point was placed beyond question by the statement-"We think that ... Congress meant... that in a case involving
competitive injury between a seller's customers, the Commission need
only prove that a seller had charged one purchaser a higher price for
like goods than he had charged one or more of the purchaser's com24
petitors."
This seems to settle the law as to who has the burden of proof, but
the question of how the burden shall be met was not presented.'
We
get a clue, however, that it must be by explicit showing, from the
Court's attitude toward carload discounts. It is arguable that the ten
cent per unit discount on carload shipments is so obviously the result
of a saving in transportation costs that judicial notice could be taken
of the fact at least so far as to raise a presumption in favor of the
seller.2 6 But the Court said carload discounts, "like all others, can be
justified by a seller who proves that the full amount of the discount is
based on his actual savings in cost. The trouble with this phase of re2
spondent's case is that it has thus far failed to make such proof." '
Perhaps the most significant phase of the case, at least so far as
the practical enforcibility of the Act is concerned, is in regard to the
2

"Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which

make only due allowance for differences, in the cost of manufacture, sale, or de-

livery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities
are to such purchasers sold or delivered."
"Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 822, 827 (1948);
60 HAnv. L. Rav. 1167 (1948) ; 42 IL. L. Rv. 556 (1948) ; 15 U. OF CH. L. R v.
384 (1948).
" Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 822, 827-8 (1948).
The conclusion is based both upon the general rule of statutory construction that
the party seeking to avail himself of an exception to a prohibition has the burden
of bringing himself within it, and upon §2(b) which gives the commission a prima

fade case upon proof of discrimination "unless justification shall be affirmatively
shown." See, 80 CoNG. REc. 3599 (1936).

" Much has been written and said about this eminently practical problem, which
is beyond the scope of this note. For specimens see Freer, Accounting Problems
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 65 J. ACCOUNTANCy 480 (1938) ; Thorp, Price

Discriminationand Cost, 63 J. ACcOUNTANcY 183 (1937) ; Ostlund, supra note 10;
Haslett, Price Discriminations and Their Justifications Under the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, 46 Mica. L. Rav. 450, 472 (1948).
"6See Haslett, The Validity of Quantity Discounts, SymPosiuM (CCH) 26, 34
(1948) (disapproving).
" Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 822, 829 (1948).
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finding of requisite injury to competition. Under the Clayton Act discriminations were unlawful where their effect "may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create monopoly in any line of commerce."

By adding to this the phrase "or to injure, destroy or prevent competition with any person .. .", Congress intended that the work of the
Commission in curbing injurious practices at their inception should be
facilitated by maldng the law "less rigorous in its provisions as to the
effect required to be shown in order to bring a given discrimination
within its prohibitions." 28 The Circuit Court of Appeals did not hold
simply that the burden of alleging and proving the required competitive
effect was upon the Commission, which the Commission had from the
very beginning assumed to be the case 29 and which the present Supreme
Court decision does not disturb. But, in attacking the evidence in this
case as insufficient, it virtually required a showing of actual injury.3 0
-Such a conclusion clearly finds no support either in the language of the
Act or in the cases construing it. The courts have quite generally considered the phrase "may be substantially to injure, etc.", as used in
these Clayton Act sections, as requiring a finding simply of 'reasonable

probability of injury described.3 1 In reversing the lower court, however, the Supreme Court saw the statute as requiring of the Commission no more than a finding of reasonable possibility of requisite injury,
a conclusion which itself constitutes a substantial departure in the other
direction from the interpretation hitherto considered fairly well es32
tablished.
"'Remarks of Congressman Utterback, 80 CoNG. EC. 9417 (1936). This is
generally conceded. But see McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 415 (belief that the
Amendment did not substantially extend the area already covered by the Clayton

Act).

"Austern, Required Competitive Injury, SYmposIum (CCH) 63, 68 (1947);
Haslett, Price Discriminationsand Their Justifications Under the Robinson-Patmals Act of 1936, 46 Micr. L. Rxv. 450, 474 (1948). F. T. C. Brief in Opposition,
p. 8, Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 148 F. 2d 378 (C.C.A.
2d 1945) reprinted in Austern, supra, at 73 ("The Commission has always construed the Act to require it as a part of its affirmative case to present evidence
that a discrimination may lessen or tend to injure competition.")..
"8Or so it seems, if the evidence must reveal that a competitor of a favored
buyer was forced to "re-sell at a substantially reduced profit" before the court
can detect a violation. Morton Salt Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 162 F. 2d
949, 956 (C.C.A. 7th 1947). See 15 U. OF CH . L. REv. 384, 387 (1948) and
Haslett, Price Discriminationsand Their Justifications Under the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, 46 Mici. L. REv. 450, 466-7 (1948).
' Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726,
738 (1945) ; International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U.S. 291,
298 (1930) (§7 Clayton Act); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co.,
258 U.S. 346, 356-7 (1922) (§3 Clayton Act). But cf. United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 411 (1914) (Food & Drug Act).
"' See cases cited note 31 supra. The Court relied solely upon certain language
in the Corn Products case, supra note 31, which was forcefully demonstrated by
Mr. Justice Jackson to be in conflict with other, more carefully considered language
in the same case, and presumably to have been used inadvertently, 68 Sup. Ct. 822,
833-4 (dissenting opinion).
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The advisability of announcing the "possibility of injury" test as a
standard for the future is open to question, not merely because it was
unnecessary in order to sustain the Commission in this case,33 but particularly as a matter of sound administrative policy. By invoking the
new standard here, considerable doubt is cast upon the prospective
status of other Clayton Act sections which contain substantially the
same language 3 4 More fundamentally, the Federal Trade Commission,
being an expert and specialized agency with broad powers of subpoena
and investigation should be in a position to demonstrate with adequate
evidence that a given discrimination will probably result in the effect
required.3 5 As a matter of fact, the Commission has made at least this
showing in the §2(a) cases which have gone before the courts in recent
years.38 Whether the Commission will now avail itself of this more
liberal standard, or will continue its apparent policy, is a question of
great importance to all concerned with the Act, because a practical result-of the test announced could be to shift a large portion of the burden of proof in this matter to the defendant, who is least able to
meet it. That is, in order to defend on the ground that the required
competitive effect is not inherent in his pricing schedule, the respondent
must rebut the slender showing of possible effect, presumably with
proof that injury cannot or will not result. Moreover, it is but a short
logical step from this to the point of shifting the entire burden by
allowing an inference that injury is possible from the existence of a
price discrimination.3 7 Already this result has been reached in two
instances38 by invoking the prima facie case provision of §2(b), and
" Id. at 828 ("There are specific findings that such [actual] injuries had resulted
from respondent's discounts although the statute does not require the Commission
to find that injury has actually resulted.") ; id. 835 ("It is not merely probable
but I think it is almost inevitable that the cumulative discounts [tend to injure competition]") (dissenting opinion).
",Will the same standard apply to §3 concerning tying clauses and §7 concerning stock acquisitions?
" Oppenheim, Should the Robinson-Patman Act Be Amended?, Symposxu
(CCH) 141, 152 (1948).
" Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 68 Sup. Ct. 793, 815 (1948);
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 144 F. 2d 211, 215
(C.C.A. 7th 1944) ; A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 144 F.
2d 221, 223-4 (C.C.A. 7th 1944) (reversing its earlier conclusion, 135 F. 2d 453,
455, that injury was not shown) ; E. B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 142 F. 2d 511, 518 (C.C.A. 6th 1944); Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 148 F. 2d 378 (C.C.A. 2d 1945) on which see Austern, supra
note 29, at 70-1.
",Morton

Salt Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 162 F. 2d 949, 960 (C.C.A.

7th 1947) ("The fact of the discrimination itself, it seems to me, would have
supported an inference that the effect may be to lessen competition.") (dissenting
opinion of Judge Minton).
"' Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 148 F. 2d 378 (C.C.A.
2d 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1944), modified, 155 F. 2d 1016 (1946)
(Commission must show 1. differential in price, 2. competitors who could be injured; then the burden is on respondent to show either no injury to competition
or a justification, id. 379); Standard Oil Co., CCH

(FTC 1946).

TRADE REG.

SEnv. 13,447
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the problem may soon be before the Supreme Court for determination
in the Standard Oil case (now pending review before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals), wherein the Commission stated: "Based upon
the prima facie case ... shown the Commission may draw from such
prima facie case a rebuttable presumption that the effect of such discrimination may be to .... injure, destroy or prevent competition. The
burden then shifts to the respondent." 3 9
Whether or not this view will be urged, and if urged sustained in
the courts, it is quite certain the Morton Salt case is no authority for
the doctrine. That the burden rests with the Commission to make whatever showing is required, is implicit throughout the opinion. And before the Morton case is used to go further in the direction of shifting
the burden to the defendant, it would be well to bear in mind another
consideration forcefully suggested by Albert Sawyer some eight years
ago.
"The broad inference of injury from the fact of discrimination
places before the Commission the strong temptation to depart
from the realities of each individual case and write into these inferences economic doctrine which may or may not have the sanction of actual experience. The long range usefulness of the Act,
depends to a large measure upon the extent to which the Commission works into the daily consciousness of American businessmen the rightfulness of the nondiscrimination policy. A factual
determination of injury or tendency toward injury clearly presented in each case will do more than any other one thing to encourage business practice consistent with the objective of the
Act."40
The Supreme Court's unequivocal ruling in"this case that neither
actual injury to competition nor absence of cost justification is required
of the Commission as a part of its case, is essential to effective Robinson-Patman Act enforcement. Since only limited funds and facilities
are available to the Commission for the execution of its important and
difficult regulative functions, to require more proof in establishing violations of laws within its jurisdiction than the laws apparently demand,
is seriously to hinder their enforcement. To require less, however, as
does the Supreme Court's possibility of injury standard, is to invite
into the law a practice inconsistent with basic principles underlying
"Id. at (slip report) 14-15. This concerned whether the §2(b) proviso for
meeting an equally low price of a competitor is a substantive or procedural defense, but this tendency to oversimplify the Commission's case comes "perilously
close to converting the Commission's prima facie case into a virtual per se violation based upon a mere price difference." Oppenheim, Should the Robinson-Patman Act Be Amended?, SYmposIum (CCH) 141, 152 (1948). Compare, Mr.
Justice Jackson in International Salt Co. v. United States, 68 Sup. Ct. 12, 15
(1948).
note 14, at 501.
" Sawyer, supra
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the rules on burden of proof and procedural due process which obtain
not only in the orthodox courts, but quasi-judicial, administrative proceedings as well.
ERNEST W. MACHEN, JR.
Conflict of Laws-Divorce-Coflateral Attack onDivisibility ofThe United States Supreme Court recently decided four cases which
have significant bearing on the degree of credit to which a foreign decree of divorce is entitled. The legal points dealt with in the first two
cases are different from those in the last two; therefore, they will be
treated separately.
COLLATERAL ATTACK By REsPONDENT WHO APPEARED IN

DIVORCE ACTION
Respondent,' Sherrer, had appeared generally in a divorce action,
brought by petitioner in Florida three months after she left respondent
in Massachusetts where they had resided for twelve years. Petitioner
there alleged, and the Florida court found, that she was a bona fide
resident of Florida. Respondent did not challenge either the allegation
or finding. The divorce was granted. Respondent brought this suit
in Massachusetts in which he alleged that the petitioner was his wife
and prayed that he might be allowed to convey his realty as if he were
sole and living apart from her justifiably. The Probate Court granted
the relief prayed for, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
affirmed on the ground that petitioner was never domiciled in Florida.
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court held that the requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from attacking collaterally
a divorce decree on jurisdictional grotinds in the courts of a sister state
where there has been participation by the defendant in the divorce
proceedings, and where the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues. 2
The Supreme Court had held in Williams v. North Carolinas that
while the finding of domicile by the court that granted the decree is
entitled to prima facie weight, it is not conclusive in the state of matrimonial domicile but might be relitigated there, in a bigamy prosecution.
In Dazis v. Davis,4 where the defendant had appeared and fully litigated the issue of the plaintiff's domicile, the Court held that the finding
"Petitioner" and "respondent" are used throughout to refer to the petitioner
and respondeht in the divorce proceeding.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 68 Sup. Ct. 1087 (1948). The decision in this case applies also to the companion case of Coe v. Coe, 68 Sup. Ct. 1094 (1948), therefore
the cases are treated as one. Accord: In re Biggers, 228 N. C. 743 (1948).
'325 U. S. 226 (1945). See Baer, So Your Client Wants a Divorce, 24 N. C.
L. REv. 1 (1945).
'305 U. S. 32 (1938).

